Dr. Stefan Behringer

Universität Duisburg-Essen
Mercator School of Management
LS Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre
Lotharstrasse 65
47057 Duisburg, Germany

e-mail: stefan.behringerATuni-due.de

 
• Cournotian Dynamics of Spatially Distributed Renewable Resources (with Sebastian Anita & Ana-Maria Mosneagu, University of Iasi, and Thorsten Upmann, Universität Bielefeld).

Abstract:
We extend modern Walrasian economics and in particular the results on Cournot convergence and dynamics by focusing on renewable resources in a spatial setting. Building on the harvesting model of Behringer and Upmann (2014) we endogenize prices using a linear inverse demand function and investigate the cases of durable and non-durable renewable commodities. We find that endogenizing prices is sufficient to prevent the full exploitation result and look at how competition affects not only the stock but also the temporal incentives for exploitation. We derive convergence results in static and dynamic settings which suggest that the classical Cournotian outcomes may prevail. (New Version 1/2016)
Paper in pdf format.
Under review.
 
• Product Repositioning in the UK Newspaper Industry.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the alleged predatory behaviour in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s in terms of product repositioning using a horizontal differentiation model and industry data. It supports the call for an 'effects based' approach to competition law by showing that non-price conduct can be a critical and less visible, complementary means to achieve a predatory goal than mere price cuts.
Paper in pdf format.
Forthcoming 2016: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol 6, Issue 5, October.
 
• Network Effects, Spillovers, and Market Structure.

Abstract:
The paper investigates the effect of spillovers in a model of endogenous technical change resulting from network effects, e.g. in the market for hand-held video consoles on the existence of a lower bound to market concentration.
Paper in pdf format .
Published: The Manchester School, 2013, Vol 82, Issue 2, p.143-159.
 
• Optimal Harvesting of a Spatial Renewable Resource (with Thorsten Upmann, University Duisburg-Essen).

Abstract:
In this paper we investigate optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in the standard approach the resource is located at a single point in space we allow for the resource to be distributed over the plane. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one location to another. For a fixed planning horizon we investigate the speed and the time path of harvesting chosen by the agent. We show that the agent adjusts the speed of movement so that he accomplishes to visit each location only once, even in the absence of travelling cost. Since he does not come back to any location for a second harvest, it is optimal for him to fully deplete the resource upon arrival. A society interested in conserving some of the resource thus has to take measures suitable to limit the exploitative behaviour of the agent.
CESifo Working Paper No.4019 in pdf format.
Published: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, Vol. 42, p.105-120.
 
• Direct Provision of a Public Good with Many Agents.

Abstract:
The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests a proportional relationship between incentives to free-ride and group size. However recent empirical research and casual observation of modern information technologies suggests otherwise. This paper purports a solution to the apparent paradox within a mechanism design framework tailored to modular developments within these technologies and provides a positive limit result as the number of agents gets large. (New Version 3/2013)
Paper in pdf format .
 
• Public Good Provision with many Agents: The kn-success technology (with Yukio Koriyama, Ecole Polytechnique).

Abstract:
In this paper, we consider a class of public good provision problems in which the production function takes the form of kn-success technology, an extension of the direct provision technology considered in Behringer (2013). These models are suitable to describe the free-rider problems in which there are a large number of agents who are both users and bene- ficiaries of a public good at the same time, e.g. open-source software or social networks. We provide results on asymptotic efficiency which con- nect a negative result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and a positive result of Hellwig (2003), as well as a set of examples which allow us welfare comparison with the standard technologies. (New Version 3/2015)
Paper in pdf format .
  

• Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry.
  
  Abstract:
  The paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the Telecommunications industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Economics Letters, 2009, Vol. 102(3), p.185-188.
  
  
• Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly: Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites revisited.
  
  Abstract:
  We investigate the equilibrium market structure in virtual platform duopoly such as that of eBay and Yahoo! auctions. Building on the model of Ellison, Fudenberg, & Möbius (2004) we take full account of the complexity of network effects on such platforms. We extend the model by looking at the implication of exogenous and endogenous buyer and seller charges (i.e. vertical product differentiation) making use of the concept of insulating tariffs. This extension brings in line the theory with the empirical findings of Brown & Morgan (2006). Eventually we investigate welfare effects, look at the viability of duopoly with size differentials, and the implications for large markets. (Version 5/2013)
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Analysis of Competition Policy and Sectoral Regulation, CRESSE, eds. Peitz, M. and Spiegel, Y. 2014, World Scientific.
  
  
• Asymmetric Equilibria and Competitive Access Pricing in the Telecommunications Industry.
  
  Abstract:
  This paper looks at competition in the telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level and thus reconcile theory with regulatory practice.
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Int. J. Management and Network Economics, 2012, Vol.2, No.3, p.257-281.
  
  
• Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry (with Edmond Baranes and Jean-Christophe Poudou, University Montpellier 1).
  
  Abstract:
  This paper considers collusion between asymmetric networks in the telecommunications industry. Its primary purpose is to fill the gap between the literature on collusion between asymmetric firms and the literature on collusion in the telecommunications industry. Employing the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination we allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo the locations, the consumers of each network operator face an asymmetry parameter that directly impacts their demands and can capture asymmetries in demand elasticities, in demand size, or even both. The implications of these asymmetries for the possibility of sustaining collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes. (New version 10/2015)
  Paper in pdf format
  Forthcoming 2016: Annals of Economics and Statistics (formerly Annales de l'INSEE www.annales.ensae.fr)
  
  
  
• Price Wars in Two-Sided Markets: The case of the UK Quality Newspaper Industry (with Lapo Filistrucchi, University of Florence).
  
  Abstract:
  This paper investigates the price war in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s. We show that the empirical evidence is in accordance with a substantial change in the optimal finance mix of newspapers as advertising becomes the dominant source of newspaper revenue. The evidence brought forward at the time is not sufficient to establish a case of predatory pricing as it has neglected the critical two-sidedness of firms and necessitates further study.
  Paper in pdf format
  
  
• Hotelling Competition and Political Differentiation with more than two Newspapers (with Lapo Filistrucchi, University of Florence).
  
  Abstract:
  We analyse a market where media firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. Firms first choose their political differentiation, then set cover prices and advertising tariffs. We build on the duopoly model of Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001, 2002) who show that advertising financing can lead to minimum political differentiation of the newspapers and hence a lack of plurality of political views or pensée unique. We extend their model to more than two newspapers and show that, contrary to popular belief in competition policy, concern for such lack of plurality may diminish but does not disappear as the number of firms increases.
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Information Economics and Policy, 2015, Vol. 30, p.36-49.
  
  
• Areeda-Turner in Two-Sided Markets (with Lapo Filistrucchi, University of Florence).
  
  Abstract:
  We first extend the Areeda-Turner rule to two-sided markets. Since prices below marginal cost on one side of the market cannot be considered a sign of predation, our proposed extension takes into account revenues and costs from both sides. We then analyse two alleged cases of predatory behaviour in the market for daily newspapers. These examples highlight that applying a one-sided Areeda-Turner rule may lead to assess a perfectly legitimate profit-maximizing pricing policy as a predatory attempt or, on the contrary, to consider legitimate prices that should be deemed predatory in the spirit of the original Areeda-Turner rule.(New version 2/2015)
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Review of Industrial Organization, 2015, Vol. 46, pp.287-306.
  

• 1998 - 2004: PhD Student, Graduiertenkolleg Finanz- und Gütermärkte, Universität Mannheim, Germany and  Institut d'Economie Industrielle IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse.
• 1996 - 1998: Master of Science in Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science.
• 1995 - 1996: Master of Arts in Law & Economics, Universität Hamburg.
• 1992 - 1995: Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, University of York.

• 2012 - 2013: Acting Professor (Lehrstuhlvertreter), Professur für VWL, Wirtschaftstheorie II, Universität Heidelberg.
• 2010 - 2011: Acting Professor (Lehrstuhlvertreter), Professur für VWL, Wirtschaftstheorie III, Universität Bonn.
• 2009: Acting Professor (Lehrstuhlvertreter), Professur für Mikroökonomie, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
• 2004 - 2009: Assistant Professor, Project on Internet Economics, Goethe Universität Frankfurt.

 
Long CV in pdf format (11kb)

Professor Martin Hellwig
MPI for Research on Collective Goods
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn
Germany

Professor John Sutton
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
England

Professor Patrick Rey
IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales
Manufacture des Tabacs
21, Allée de Brienne Bât. F
31000 Toulouse
France

 

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