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Research Summary |
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SciencesPo e-mail: stefan.behringerATsciencespo.fr |
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Papers |
Abstract: This paper investigates a Bayesian inverse problem of a price setting monopolist facing a random demand. In contrast to previous investigations an unknown true market potential of demand is distorted by two independent Gaussian errors, a zero-mean additive and a unity-mean multiplicative one. The multi-period game allows for learning from realized market demands (signals). Interestingly increasing the level of noise of a multiplicative error in this dynamic setting can actually improve the Value of Information of signals to the firm, a result that cannot hold for a single additive error or in a static context. Paper in pdf format. Published: Theoretical Economics Letters, 2021, Vol 11, p.116-124. https://www.scirp.org/pdf/tel_2021022410371431.pdf Abstract: We investigate a Bayesian inverse problem in the specific setting of a game with a price setting monopolist facing a randomly growing demand in multiple interconnected markets. Investigating the Value of Information of a signal to the monopolist, both in full and pro-rata, we find that the former can be non-monotonic in the variance of the signal whereas the latter will always be monotonic. This implies that there are ranges of the signal noise over which the Value of Information may either decline or increase. This range critically depend on the exogenous growth rate of the market potentials. (New Version 12/2020) Paper in pdf format. Submitted. Abstract: We extend modern Walrasian economics and in particular the results on Cournot convergence and dynamics by focusing on renewable resources in a spatial setting. Building on the harvesting model of Behringer and Upmann (2014) we endogenize prices using a linear inverse demand function and investigate the cases of durable and non-durable renewable commodities. We find that endogenizing prices is sufficient to prevent the full exploitation result and look at how competition affects not only the stock but also the temporal incentives for exploitation. We derive convergence results in static and dynamic settings which suggest that the classical Cournotian outcomes may prevail. (New Version 1/2016) Paper in pdf format. Published: arXiv 2017 http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.05930. Abstract: We model an economy of K heterogeneous regions where agents value consumption vs. nature differently. Consumption obtained through pollution-inducing production also generates a negative externality on neighbors. We show that even with a decentralized policy we can obtain first-best effciency by choosing a combination of pollution taxes in both regions and lump-sum transfers. Moreover, we show that optimal pollution taxes are determined only by the externality parameters, independent of agents' preferences for consumption and nature. Paper in pdf format. Supplementary Material. Published: Economics Letters, 2017, Vol 157, p.79-82. Abstract: This paper investigates the alleged predatory behaviour in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s in terms of product repositioning using a horizontal differentiation model and industry data. It supports the call for an 'effects based' approach to competition law by showing that non-price conduct can be a critical and less visible, complementary means to achieve a predatory goal than mere price cuts. Paper in pdf format. Published: Theoretical Economics Letters, 2016, Vol 6, Issue 5, p.986-999. Abstract: The paper investigates the effect of spillovers in a model of endogenous technical change resulting from network effects, e.g. in the market for hand-held video consoles on the existence of a lower bound to market concentration. Paper in pdf format . Published: The Manchester School, 2013, Vol 82, Issue 2, p.143-159. Abstract: In this paper we investigate optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in the standard approach the resource is located at a single point in space we allow for the resource to be distributed over the plane. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one location to another. For a fixed planning horizon we investigate the speed and the time path of harvesting chosen by the agent. We show that the agent adjusts the speed of movement so that he accomplishes to visit each location only once, even in the absence of travelling cost. Since he does not come back to any location for a second harvest, it is optimal for him to fully deplete the resource upon arrival. A society interested in conserving some of the resource thus has to take measures suitable to limit the exploitative behaviour of the agent. CESifo Working Paper No.4019 in pdf format. Published: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, Vol. 42, p.105-120. Abstract: In standard models of spatial harvesting, a resource is distributed over a continuous domain with an agent who may harvest everywhere all the time. For some cases though (e.g., fruits, mushrooms, algae), it is more realistic to assume that the resource is located at a fixed point within that domain so that an agent has to travel in order to be able to harvest. This creates a combined travelling–and–harvesting problem where slower travel implies a lower travelling cost and, due to a later arrival, a higher abundance of the resource at the beginning of the harvesting period; this, though, has to be traded off against less time left for harvesting, given a fixed planning horizon. Possible bounds on the controls render the problem even more intricate. We scrutinise this bioeconomic setting using a two-stage optimal control approach, and find that the agent economises on the travelling cost and thus avoids to arrive at the location of the resource too early. More specifically, the agent adjusts the travelling time so as to be able to harvest with maximum intensity at the beginning and the end of the harvesting period, but may also find it optimal to harvest at a sustainable level, where the harvesting and the growth rate of the stock coincide, in an intermediate time interval. CESifo Working Paper No.6742 in pdf format. Published: Theoretical Ecology, 26 August 2020, Open Access, Final paper in pdf format . Abstract: The Paper surveys literature on Machine Replacements. Published: Math. Inst. Steklova, 2016, p.17-23, Final paper in pdf format . Abstract: The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests a proportional relationship between incentives to free-ride and group size. However recent empirical research and casual observation of modern information technologies suggests otherwise. This paper purports a solution to the apparent paradox within a mechanism design framework tailored to modular developments within these technologies and provides a positive limit result as the number of agents gets large. (New Version 3/2013) Paper in pdf format . Abstract: In this paper, we consider a class of public good provision problems in which the production function takes the form of kn-success technology, an extension of the direct provision technology considered in Behringer (2013). These models are suitable to describe the free-rider problems in which there are a large number of agents who are both users and bene- ficiaries of a public good at the same time, e.g. open-source software or social networks. We provide results on asymptotic efficiency which connect a negative result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and a positive result of Hellwig (2003), as well as a set of examples which allow us welfare comparison with the standard technologies. (New Version 3/2015) Paper in pdf format .
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Brief CV |
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Long CV and References |
Long CV in pdf format (11kb) Professor
Martin Hellwig
Professor
John Sutton Professor
Patrick Rey |